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The Effects of Early Stage Venture Capitalist Actions 
on Eventual Venture Disposition
Lowell W. Busenitz 
James O. Fiet
This study examines the relationship between venture capitalist actions and the eventual 
disposition of a venture through an IPO, which is the most profitable exit strategy. The 
actions included in this study were (1) altering the amount of their investment; (2) secur­
ing a concentrated equity position; (3) diversifying their syndicate investments; and (4) 
introducing their investees to other sources o f financing. After five years, this study 
found a positive relationship between IPO exit and (1) the amount of their investment; 
and (2) the diversification o f their VC syndicate. However, it found only mixed results 
for (1) venture capitalist concentrated equity position; and (2) introductions to other 
sources o f funding. Finally, implications for future research are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most research on investing in new businesses has concluded that venture capital­
ists (VCs) serve a valuable intermediary function (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & 
Vetsuypens, 1990; Lam, 1991; Lemer, 1994; Mull, 1994; Norton, 1993) by creat­
ing more rewarding financial outcomes for their investee ventures and ultimately 
for themselves. Although there has been much discussion about how VCs should 
invest (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Chan, 1983), how to implement various con­
tracting technologies (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 1994; Barry, 1994;), and 
where they should attempt to add value (MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian 1989; 
Sapienza, 1992), many questions remain unanswered. This paper contributes to 
this discussion by asking: “Do early-stage venture capitalist actions impact a VC’s 
prospects for profitably exiting a venture?”
VC value-added research can be divided into two tracks. One track has 
emphasized the value VCs can add by providing operational and strategic advice 
(MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989; Barney, Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel, 1996), 
assisting with the recruitment and dismissal of key managers (Fiet, Busenitz, Moe­
sel & Barney, in press; Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & Taylor, 1993; Wame,
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1988), and helping entrepreneurs to make contacts with critical suppliers and cus­
tomers (Sapienza, 1992). Furthermore, VC involvement with a venture’s manage­
ment can reduce the riskiness of cash flows by alerting them about possible sources 
of concern (Gompers, 1995). The majority of this work has tested hypotheses uti­
lizing cross-sectional data collection. A second research track has compared VC- 
backed and non-VC-backed firms, specifically focusing on VC contributions to 
gains in performance (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Barry et al., 1990; Chan, 1983; 
Lam, 1991; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Mull, 1994). The central findings from this 
track have been that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms (Mull, 
1994); the retention of VC equity after the initial public stock offering (IPO) seems 
to be favorably perceived by financial markets (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994); larger 
VC equity positions are also favorably perceived (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994); and 
VCs provide an important link to other sources of financing (Lam, 1991).
Findings from this second stream are largely based on research from firms that 
have sold their shares in a pubUc offering. ^  Researchers have selected these pubhcly 
traded firms because prior studies suggest that this type of disposition has been the 
most profitable for VCs and because it can serve as a proxy for a high level of per­
formance (Gladstone, 1989; Lam, 1991).  ^ The availabihty of data for these IPO 
firms is another reason for their frequent examination (Barry, 1994). Unfortunately, 
hmiting inquiry to only IPO firms constrains the reUability of these findings because 
it tends to over-sample successful ventures, to bypass the investigation of causality 
by ignoring appropriate control variables, and to leave many unanswered questions 
about the impact of early stage VC activities on long-term venture performance.
VCs work closely with their investees during the early stages of their relation­
ship because they beUeve that their input is vital (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). 
Moreover, it may be that it is in this earlier period when VCs can make the most 
important impact on venture performance (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Despite 
their likely importance, no known studies have examined the effects of early stage 
VC actions on a VC’s prospects for an IPO exit. Instead, they have sampled con­
comitant VC activities in the post-IPO era when less variance in performance from 
the effects of VC involvement would be expected.
The plan for this paper is as follows. Section II develops the theory and 
hypotheses for four different VC actions. Section HI presents the research method­
ology. Section IV presents the data analysis showing the effects of VC actions on 
the probabiUty of an IPO exit. The conclusions and research implications are pre­
sented in Section V.
II. THE EFFECT OF EARLY STAGE VC ACTIONS ON IPO EXIT
The early stage VC actions examined by this paper include:^ (1) the amount of the 
investment made by VCs in each syndicate (cf., Lam, 1991; Lemer, 1994); (2) the
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impact of majority VC ownership (cf, Holdemess & Sheehan, 1988); (3) the diver­
sification of VC syndicates (cf., Barry et al., 1990); and (4) VC introductions to 
other sources of financing (cf., Lam, 1991). Although these VC actions have been 
examined by other researchers, no one else known to us has tracked their impact 
over time on the eventual profitable disposition of a venture. Because IPO disposi­
tion has been shown to be the most profitable way to exit a venture (Gladstone, 
1989; Lam, 1991), the effects of these antecedents on IPO exits are central to this 
research.
The Amount of First Round Investment
Investing in new ventures, particularly ones that are based on new technology, 
is inherently risky. These businesses have no track record, no established markets, 
and sometimes require substantial investment in order to survive. Moreover, they 
frequently face competitive uncertainties with no guarantee that they will be able 
to respond to the forays of rivals, nor anticipate market opportunities (Norton, 
1993). One reason for the riskiness of new ventures is that it is very difficult to 
anticipate which technology will be selected by buyers and if a business guesses 
wrong, any investments in alternative technologies could have little or no eventual 
value (Chan, 1983).
One way to reduce the risk of investing in new businesses is to acquire risk- 
reducing information before making the investment. The most valuable type of 
risk-reducing information is specific information about people, places, special 
relationships, or timing— i^n other words— f^actors that are usually relevant to one 
particular investment opportunity (Fiet, in press; Hayek, 1945). Although there are 
a number of ways to acquire specific information, some of which are less costly 
than others, there are few other ways to reduce a venture’s riskiness other than to 
be lucky.
This recognition of the risk-reducing role of specific information is somewhat 
different from the generally accepted view that the way to reduce a VC’s risk is to 
stage investments in the business. With staged financing, if something goes wrong, 
a VC can abandon its investment and “stage” a hasty exit (Sahlman, 1990). Staging 
their investments is a way of hedging their bets on the venture. However, once a 
VC possesses specific, risk-reducing information about a venture, we suspect that 
they then place a larger bet on a particular business. Thus, we propose that the 
amount of first round investment would proxy for a venture’s investments in spe­
cific risk-reducing information, which would ultimately serve as a much more 
effective avenue for IPO exit.
HIA: The amount of first round VC funding will be positively related to the 
occurrence of an IPO exit.
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VC Equity Concentration
VCs frequently prefer concentrated equity positions and play a key role in 
important venture decisions (Barry et al., 1990). Concentrated equity positions in 
this study refer to those with more than half of the venture equity owned by VCs. 
We argue here that VC equity concentration ought to be positively related to a suc­
cessful IPO exit. We base our argument on findings from the literature on enter­
prise governance which suggest that high ownership concentration can increase 
the value of public firms (cf., Smith, 1986; Wruck, 1989). More recently, Fiet et al. 
(in press) argued in their study of the dismissal of venture team members that 
higher levels of ownership concentration could increase a VC’s power to act uni­
laterally as a member of the board of directors.
If VCs improve their prospects of an IPO exit by sometimes acting unilater­
ally, they would either have to be luckier or better informed in order to make supe­
rior judgments about a venture’s prospects than its managers. Because VCs are not 
known to be any luckier, to perform better they would have to be better informed. 
This is consistent with earlier research that has argued that VC participation in 
multiple ventures make them more informed decision makers on critical decisions 
(Barry, 1994). Thus we argue that a concentrated equity position may empower 
VCs to act unilaterally, which could result in more IPO exits, assuming that they 
were better informed.
HIB: VCs holding a majority of the equity of the venture after round one 
funding will be positively related to an IPO exit.
VC Syndicate Diversification
Venture capitalists frequently diversify their investments through the use of 
limited-hability investor syndicates (Bygrave, 1987).'^  Diversification entails 
investing in multiple businesses as a way of hedging against losses in a single busi­
ness. Although syndication is commonly seen as valuable for reducing venture 
specific risk (Norton, 1993), this study concerns itself with the impact VC syndi­
cations have on venture firms. We predict that increased VC syndication will be 
positively related to long-term venture outcome. Our arguments are based on two 
assumptions that we explain next.
First, a more diverse syndicate may reflect a superior selection process of 
investments. Building on decision making theory using polyarchies,^ Lemer 
(1994) argued that upon discovering a venture potentially worthy of investment, 
the VC typically forwards a proposal to other investors for their review. The will­
ingness of other VCs to invest in the firm may be an important factor in the lead 
VC’s decision to invest. In other words, syndication provides VCs with an oppor­
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tunity to compare their thinking with that from other respected sources of advice 
and information. Thus, larger VC syndicates may reflect a superior selection of 
investments based on them possessing superior information.
Second, participation in a syndicate may also provide long-term benefits 
because it can draw upon the expertise of multiple VCs. A larger number of inves­
tors in a specific syndicate are likely to jointly provide better resources and incen­
tives to effectively monitor a venture’s performance (Barry et al, 1990). Thus, 
larger syndicates are likely to do a better job monitoring a venture’s management 
team (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Increased monitoring effectiveness can lower 
the uncertainty associated with a venture’s managers acting in either a self-inter- 
ested or incompetent manner (Norton, 1993). Multiple evaluators who have spe­
cialized in market risk may also forestall losses due to incorrect evaluations of 
competitive conditions (cf., Fiet, 1995a; 1995b). These arguments lead to the fol­
lowing hypothesis:
HlC: The investment diversification of the VC syndicate during round one 
funding will be positively related to long-term venture performance, 
as indicated by an IPO exit from the business.
Early Stage Introductions to Other Sources of Financing
In order for a VC to benefit from a profitable IPO, it often must be willing to 
endure diminished periods of venture growth. During periods of slow growth VCs 
may help by introducing their investees to other sources of financing. In the post- 
IPO era, VC involvement has been shown to be particularly useful in increasing 
the market’s valuation of a venture when VCs maintain a large equity stake (Lam, 
1991). Barry et al. (1990) also argued that when VCs choose to invest (or stay 
invested), they send a clear signal regarding a venture’s quality, which in tum 
influences external valuations. Because the evaluation of a venture’s performance 
is complex, outside investors may substitute the presumed positive evaluations of 
the VC(s) for their own incomplete evaluations.^ Clear signaling may reduce the 
risk of investing in new ventures by providing information about risk factors. The 
involvement of VCs may be an effective proxy for other outside assessments of 
venture stability and value.
Even if a VC chooses to minimize its financial support of developmental or 
operational expenses, it will generally be in its long-term interest to ensure that a 
venture’s managers succeed in securing financing for these essential purposes. 
One way VCs can support their investees is to introduce them to third party sources 
of financing. Although we are unaware of any prior test of this hypothesis in the 
earlier stages of VC financing, we suspect that introductions to other investors 
would be positively related to the eventual IPO disposition of the venture.
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H2: Introductions of their investees by venture capitalists to other sources 
of financing will be positively related to the long-term performance of 
the venture, as indicated by an IPO exit from the business.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Independent Variables
We collected data for the independent variables by surveying ventures that had 
received at least one round of venture capital funding. Eight hundred thirty-seven 
ventures were identified in the 1987-1989 editions of Venture Capital Journal. 
Using Dillman’s (1978) Total Design Method, which is an approach that incorpo­
rates four rounds of subject contacts, we generated responses from 235 firms, for a 
response rate of twenty-eight percent.
Thirty of these firms indicated that their financing was used for either seed 
money or a leveraged buy-out.^ After deleting firms receiving either seed money 
or financing for a leveraged buy out, we compiled a final sample of 205 firms.
We also compiled data on VC-funded ventures and their stage of financing. 
We obtained this information from the Venture Capital Journal to check for pos­
sible response biases, which were not found.*
We computed the amount invested per VC investor by dividing the total 
amount of first round funding by the number of VCs in the syndicate.
We computed VC syndicate diversification as follows:^
lljm if
VC syndicate diversification = 1 -
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(Zjmij)^
where “7” equals the number of VCs in the syndicate and “mif’ equals the percent­
age of total first round investment in venture firm “i” made by VC firm “/”. The 
denominator was added as an adjustment to the original measure to acconmiodate 
the use of VC investment data not summing to one. By way of example, these cal­
culations resulted in a score of “0” if only one VC contributed to round one fund­
ing, a score of “0.50” if two VCs invested equally, a score of “0.667” if three VCs 
invested equally, etc. The scores for our study ranged from 0.0 to 0.829.
We measured VC equity ownership using a survey question that asked the 
entrepreneur, “After first round financing, what percentage of [your venture’s] out­
standing shares were held by venture capital firms?” We then collapsed the VC 
equity ownership variable into a majority VC equity ownership variable by coding 
it as a “1” if a VC syndicate obtained more than fifty percent ownership during first 
round financing. All other observations were coded as “0.” Upon completion of
first round financing, fifty-four percent of the VC syndicates held majority owner­
ship positions.
We measured new financing sources using a single item, 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). The item asked if 
“Our VCs introduce us to other sources of financing”.
Dependent Variable
Venture disposition data was collected during 1995. The status of each VC- 
backed venture was categorized as follows: (1) no longer in business; (2 ) ''living 
dead' (private and/or marginally profitable); (3) merged or acquired; and (4) IPOs 
(pubUcly traded and/or initial public offerings).^ ®
We located data on each of these four types of venture disposition by search­
ing the following sources: Compact Disclosure, Million Dollar Directory, Ward’s 
Business Directory, CorpTech Directory, Mergers and Acquisitions Journal, and 
F&S Predicast. If we could not determine a venture’s disposition from these 
sources, we contacted its VC by fax or telephone to inquire. These procedures suc­
cessfully classified 196 out of 205 firms that had received first round funding.^ *
Control Variables
There are other factors that could influence how a VC exits from a venture in 
addition to those for which we have hypothesized effects. We controlled for the 
effects of the most prominent of these factors mentioned in the literature, which 
included (1) year of first round funding', (2 ) industry competitiveness', (3) techno­
logical differentiation', (4) specific resource endowments', and (5) size of the venture.
We included the year of first round funding because it takes time for a venture 
to mature and to develop a market for its products or services. Because the time since 
first round funding varied among the ventures in our sample, it was necessary to con­
trol for the potential impact of this age-related factor of going through an IPO.
If we accept the proposition that industry structure dictates the range of 
acceptable strategies available to a venture, which determines its performance or 
type of disposition (cf. Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980), it is crucial to 
assess the structural attractiveness of a venture’s industry. An industry is structur­
ally attractive when the actions of a single competitor do not affect the profits of 
other industry firms. We measured industry attractiveness on 5-point Likert scales 
(strongly agree as “1” to strongly disagree as “5”) using six items suggested by 
Porter (1980). These items were: (1) “Essential materials for our products are hard 
to obtain” [supplier power]; (2) “Our products/services meet important customer 
needs” [customer power]; (3) “Many products/services comparable to ours are 
available” [substitutability]; (4) “Demand for our product does not fluctuate”
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[rivalry]; (5) “Other firms may start offering similar products” [threat of entry]; 
and (6 ) “Entry into our market by new firms is not difficult” [threat of entry]. We 
summed the responses to create a composite score of industry attractiveness.^^
A venture that is vulnerable to competitive pressures often attempts to protect 
itself by pursuing unique strategies. One commonly used strategy is that of techno­
logical differentiation (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Welboume, 1990). A venture 
pursuing such a strategy attempts to attract customers by offering innovative fea­
tures that are better than those of its competitors. The effect of this type of a barrier 
is that it raises the cost that potential entrants must incur to successfully pose a 
competitive threat. We measured technological differentiation using three 5-point 
Likert scales ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). We uti­
lized the following items to collect data on three scales: (1) “Our products/services 
have many unique features;” (2) “Our products/services are not protected by pat­
ents;” and (3) “We utilize R&D to differentiate our products.” The Cronbach’s 
alpha for this scale was acceptable (a = 0.725).
The most valuable resources upon which to base a strategy intended to create 
a sustainable competitive advantage are those for which there are no equivalent 
uses for them outside of the venture (cf., Hayek, 1945). If a resource were com­
monly available, others could inexpensively utilize it to duplicate a venture’s strat­
egy. Not only would duplication ruin a strategy’s capacity to sustain a competitive 
advantage, but it would also result at best in normal economic returns. The most 
valuable types of resources are those which are specific to the venture.
Specific venture resource endowments are those related to particular people, 
places, timing, or special circumstances affecting the venture, which if shifted to 
another venture would be much less valuable in this alternative use (cf., Hayek, 
1945). We attempted to tap this construct in three ways. First, we asked if any one 
on the venture’s management team had any previous startup experience with a 
venture that was at least partially funded by VCs.” This variable was coded as a 
“0” or as a “1” with “1” equaling previous startup experience with VC backing.
Second, we tapped the specificity of a venture’s human capital by asking, 
“How easy would it be for key managers in your company to apply the same man­
agerial skills in other organizations?” and “How easy would it be for key managers 
in your company to apply the same technical/engineering skills in other organiza­
tions?” Responses to these ranged from “easily transferable,” “most could easily 
be transferred,” ’’some could easily be transferred,” to “none could be easily trans­
ferred (coded one to four respectively). These items were then summed and aver­
aged with resulting scores ranging from 1 .0  to 3 .5 .
Some researchers have found evidence that the “top” VC firms may add more 
value than others (Barry et al., 1990; Rosenstein et al., 1993). Bygrave (1987) 
noted that thirteen percent of the sixty-one VC firms in his sample managed fifty- 
seven percent of the total pool of venture capital. Because the “top” classification
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used by other researchers was apparently a qualitative scheme, we were unable to 
utilize it d irectly .W e followed Bygrave’s pattern and categorized thirteen per­
cent of VC firms identified by our sampled entrepreneurs as “top” VC firms, which 
we ranked according to the amount of their investments. '^^  We determined the size 
of their investment portfolios by referring to the 1990 Pratt’s Guide to Venture 
Capital Sources. Those VC firms managing more than $200 million (the top thir­
teen percent) were coded as “1” and the rest “0 ”.
IV. LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF EARLY-STAGE VC ACTIONS
Table 1 describes the impact of four early-stage VC actions on four types of ven­
ture disposition, one of which is an IPO exit. In regard to hypothesis lA, the still 
private group received the lowest average funding amount (Column 2 ), whereas 
the IPO group (Column 4) received the highest. The mean of $0.88 million
Table 1
The Impact of Early-Stage VC Actions on 
Four Different Types of Venture Disposition
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Long-Term Venture Firm Status
1 2 3 4“ 
Out of Still Merged or 
Business Private Acquired IPO
Hypothesis lA;
Mean Amount Invested per Investor ($ mil) 0.88 0.77 0.91 0.98
(0.70) (0.54) (0.48) (0.71)'’
Hypothesis IB:
Mean VC Equity Percentage 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.52
(0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.17)
Percentage of firms with VC Majority 0.71 0.45 0.61 0.55
Ownership (0.45) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50)
Hypothesis 1C:
Mean VC syndicate diversification index 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.63
(0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.23)
Mean Number of First Round Investors'^ 2.96 2.76 2.83 3.65
(1.94) (1.67) (1.78) (1.91)
Hypothesis 2:
Mean VC Introductions to 3.06 3.66 5.50 4.00
Other Funding Sources (0.89) (0.95) (0.99) (0.91)
Notes: ^The number of observations in each category are as follows: Out of Business = 28; Still Private = 82; 
Merged or Acquired = 23; IPO = 56.
^The standard deviations are in parentheses.
^ e  concentration index was utilized in this study, but the mean number of first round investors is 
reported here for comparison with prior studies.
invested per investor (see Table 2) is also substantially higher than the $0.5 million 
reported by Lemer (1994) in his study of biotechnology firms between the years of 
1978 and 1989. Table 1 also reports data on the percent of equity held by VCs after 
their first round funding (hypothesis IB). It is interesting to note that the highest 
percentage category of majority VC equity control was for the “out of business” 
group. Perhaps these were high risk ventures that ultimately failed.
ITiese data further confirm that syndication (hypothesis 1C) is a conmion, and 
possibly, an increasing component of first round funding (2.96 VC investors per 
first round investment). Lemer (1994) reported a mean of 2.2 VC investors for first 
round funding. Only 20 percent of the venture firms in this sample had a single VC 
investor for first round financing. The data on VC introductions to other funding 
sources (hypothesis 2 ) shows some modest variation with the merged or acquired 
group receiving the lowest score and the IPO class receiving the highest.
Because the dependent variable, long-term venture disposition is a categorical 
variable with four reasonably distinct classifications (out of business, still private, 
merged or acquired, and IPO), a multinomial logit model was developed for fur­
ther analysis. This statistical technique allows for the testing of a generalized logit 
along with multiple logits per subpopulation (Stokes, Davis & Koch 1995). The 
multinomial logistic regression model is an extension of the dichotomous logistic 
model (Menard, 1995). This statistical technique allows for the comparison of a 
reference class (IPOs) to the other dependent variable classifications.
The means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables are pre­
sented in Table 2. As Table 2 indicates, multicollinearity does not appear to be a 
significant problem among our independent variables.
Table 3 utilizes two panels to report the results of the multinomial logistic 
analysis. Panel A contains the Wald chi-square analysis for the overall effect of 
each independent variable in our model. These test are analogous to those found in 
a conventional ANOVA table for a balanced ANOVA design after controlling for 
all other effects. Panel B contains an analysis of maximum-likelihood estimates, 
which gives the coefficient estimates for each variable in the model. The three 
individual logits reported in Panel B compare the reference class (firms that have 
been through an IPO in this study) with each of the other three categories (out of 
business, still private, and merged or acquired).
First Round VC Investment
The Wald Chi-square statistics for the overall effects of the various indepen­
dent variables are shown in Panel A of Table 3. After controlling for the factors 
specified in Section H above, it is apparent that the average amount invested in first 
round financing significantly impacts venture dispositions. For each type of ven­
ture exit the Chi-square statistic indicates that the amount of investment made as a
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Table 3
Multinominal Logit Model with VC Investment Behaviors
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Panel A: Wald chi-square test on parameters across all venture outcomes
Wald
Parameter DOF Chi-Square
HIA: First round VC investment 3 7.62’’
HIB: VC equity concentration 3 l.TA^
HlC: VC syndicate concentration 3 11.32^
H2: New financing sources 3 4.07
Control Variables
9.70*’Year of first round funding 3
Industry competitiveness 3 2.64
Technology differentiation strategy 3 9.40'’
Previous startup experience 3 3.91
Venture specific resources 3 5.58
Top VC firms 3 2.67
-2  log likelihood ratio for covariates 10 85.7“
Panel B: Logit Models with VC Investment Behaviors: IPOs as reference class
Parameter Estimate S.E. Chi-Square
Choice group: Out of Business (22 Ventures)
HIA: First Round VC Investment 6.32e-7 4.89e-7 1.67
HIB: VC Equity Concentration 0.48 0.32 2.27
HlC: VC Syndicate Concentration 2.99 1.39 4.61*’
H2: New Financing Sources 0.24 0.33 0.53
Control Variables:
Year of First Round Funding -0.27 0.19 2.11
Industry Competitiveness 0.16 0.11 2.12
Technology Differentiation. Strategy 0.58 0.36 2.67<=
Previous Startup Experience -0.19 0.29 0.46
Venture Specific Resources -1.05 0.45 5.40**
Top VC Firms 0.58 0.66 0.77
Choice group: Still Private Businesses (74 Ventures)
HIA: First Round VC Investment 1.21e-7 4.39e-7 7.54®
HIB: VC Equity Concentration -0.12 0.24 0.26
HlC: VC Syndicate Concentration 3.91 1.2 10.66®
H2: New Financing Sources 0.17 0.26 0.43
Control Variables:
Year of First Round Funding -0.31 0.15 4.35'’
Industry Competitiveness 0.11 0.09 1.46
Technology Differentiation. Strategy 0.89 0.29 9.29®
Previous Startup Experience -0.31 0.23 2.37
Venture Specific Resources -0.44 0.37 1.41
Top VC Firms 0.43 0.51 0.71
{continued)
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Parameter Estimate S.E. Chi-Square
Choice group: Merged or Acquired (18 Ventures)
HIA: First Round VC Investment 8.22e-7 6.22e-7 1.75
HIB: VC Equity Concentration 0.52 0.34 2.36
HlC: VC Syndicate Concentration 2.29 1.53 2.22
H2: New Financing Sources 0.63 0.32 3.87'’
Control Variables;
Year of First Round Funding 0.16 0.17 0.88
Industry Competitiveness 0.03 0.12 0.08
Technology Differentiation. Strategy 0.53 0.38 1.91
Previous Startup Experience -0.56 0.32 3.09^
Venture Specific Resources -0.62 0.48 1.69
Top VC Firms 1.25 0.81 2.41
Notes: The dependent variable is a qualitative variable with one equaling the venture is now out of business; two 
equaling the venture is still private; three equaling the venture has been merged or acquired; and four 
equaling the venture has gone through an IPO.
^Different from zero at the one percent level of significance.
*^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the ten percent level of significance.
part of &st round financing does vary significantly. An examination of Table 1 
indicates that the average investment was lowest for ventures that are still private 
and it was highest for firms that have gone through an IPO.
Panel B of Table 3 contains specific logits comparing the IPO category (54 
firms) as the reference class with each of the other three categories (out of business, 
still private, and merged or acquired). It also contains maximum-likelihood esti­
mates of the model parameters, as well as the parameter estimates themselves. In 
addition, it reports that the average amount invested per VC is positively related to 
IPO disposition. The relationship is strongest and statistically significant in the 
specific logit comparing the ventures that are still private with those that have gone 
through an IPO.
VC Equity Concentration
The overall Wald Chi-square test for majority VC equity ownership (Table 3, 
Panel A) is marginally significant at the .10 level. The greatest contrast is between 
the out-of-business and still private groups. After controlling for the other effects, 
there are differences in venture status based on concentrated equity positions. Con­
centrated VC equity positions are most prevalent among those ventures that have
gone out of business (Table 1). None of the specific logits which use IPOs as a ref­
erence group (Table 3, Panel B) were statistically significant.
VC Syndicate Diversification
The Wald Chi-square statistic for the overall effect of VC syndicate diversifi­
cation is statistically significant at the .01 level (Table 3, Panel A). The more VCs 
co-invest in a syndicate, the greater is their impact on a venture’s eventual dispo­
sition. The specific logits (Table 3, Panel B) indicate that VC syndicate diversifi­
cation is positively related to IPO exit. Furthermore, this relationship is statistically 
significant in the out-of-business/IPO and still private/IPO logits. These data indi­
cate that greater investment diversification within a VC syndicate increases the 
probability that a venture will go public.
There are at least two explanations for this finding. First, it may be that the 
more VCs involve themselves in the first round investment selection process, the 
greater is the likelihood that the ventures with the greatest potential wiU be 
selected. When VCs work together in a syndicate, their combined efforts enable 
them to evaluate more specific information about a venture’s prospects, and thus 
more accurately predict its future. Second, before VCs invest in ventures via syn­
dicates, they forward prospective deals to other investors for their evaluation. The 
acceptance of an invitation by other investors to join the syndicate is probably an 
important factor in the lead VC’s final decision to invest (Lemer, 1994).
VC Introductions to Other Sources of Financing
The VC literature has frequently noted that VC funding adds substantial cred­
ibility to entrepreneurial ventures when they attempt to obtain additional investors 
and other types of financing. Most testing of this hypothesis has occurred in the 
post-IPO era. This study examined early VC introductions to other sources of 
financing. The overall Wald Chi-square statistic was not significant although the 
specific logit for the merged or acquired versus IPO logit was significant at the. 10 
level and the variable is consistently positive as shown in Panel B of Table 3. VCs 
that introduce their investees to other sources of supplemental financing are some­
what more likely to go pubUc versus being merged or acquired by another firm.
V. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The relationship between VCs and their investees continues to capture the atten­
tion of researchers, practitioners, and outside observers. Prior research has gener­
ally examined their relationship either in the early stages of the venture with a 
cross-sectional design or it has compared VC-backed versus non-VC-backed ven-
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tures in the post IPO era. In contrast, this study uses a longitudinal design to 
explore if VC investment behavior during the first round financing is significantly 
related to IPO exit after five years. This analysis provides evidence that these 
early-stage investment strategies are related to IPO exit after five years.
One of this study’s most important findings is that greater VC investments in 
the first round tend to increase the probability that the venture will go public or be 
merged or acquired. We argued in Section II that when VCs possess greater 
amounts of specific information about an investee firm that they are more willing 
to coirunit themselves to higher levels of funding.
Much attention has been given to how VCs stage their investments in order 
incrementally to explore risk and to increase monitoring effectiveness. Although 
these may be benefits of a staged approach, staging may also limit a venture’s 
growth by restricting the amount of specific, risk-reducing information available to 
the venture team to make strategic decisions (Fiet, 1995b). Future research should 
further examine this phenomenon and also explore the possible down-side to 
investing in specific information, which is that it may become a sunk cost with lit­
tle or no value in future investments.
Another finding from this study is that when VCs diversify their investments, 
individual ventures in their portfolio have a significantly better probability of an 
IPO exit. This finding is consistent with Lemer’s (1994) assertion that VCs prefer 
investing in syndicates as a way of comparing their own thinking with that of other 
potential VC investors. Other VCs’ willingness to invest in a venture may be an 
important factor in a lead venture investor’s decision to invest. Larger syndicates 
have access to more comprehensive investments in specific information about par­
ticular ventures, which could improve the venture selection process. Larger syndi­
cates are also likely to bring together more expertise, support, and the availability 
of capital for current and follow-on cash needs. If one VC looses confidence in a 
venture’s future or if it needs to cash out a fund to satisfy co-investors in another 
deal, then remaining VCs in the syndicate may be willing to provide additional 
capital. Future research should examine which of these two arguments make the 
largest contribution to an eventual IPO disposition.
This study examined the effect on IPO exit of a few different VC actions that 
could be initiated by VC syndicates. Future research could examine the effects on 
IPO exit of larger ventures versus smaller ventures and older ventures versus 
younger ventures within each syndicate, diversity of actual investments made by 
VC syndicates and their important impact on venture development. Lemer (1994) 
found that the more established VC firms tended to syndicate with one another in 
the first found and then include more diverse VCs in later rounds.
Finally, this study found little to support the value of VC introductions to 
additional sources of financing. One limitation of this test is that data were 
obtained for most firms soon after they received first round financing. Future
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research should investigate this phenomenon after a venture has received a couple 
of rounds of VC funding.
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NOTES
1. In 1989, Gladstone described six ways that a VC can exit from a venture: (1) sale of the com­
pany’s stock in an IPO; (2) sale of the company’s stock to another company; (3) repurchase of 
the VC’s stock by the company itself; (4) sale of the stock to another investor; (5) reorganiza­
tion of the company; and (6) liquidation of the company. Because an IPO overcomes the detri­
mental effect of small numbers bargaining (cf., Williamson, 1975), it is widely believed to be 
the most profitable of these exit strategies.
2. Lam (1991) found that even if a VC is required to maintain a stake in the venture after the IPO, 
“part of the risk premium will dissipate after a public offering as information about firm value 
increases. This is to say that for a given fiindamental value of a firm, an investor can realize a 
higher return if he divests his investment after the firm has gone public” (p. 148).
3. Others have examined whether their advice has a positive impact on venture performance (Bar­
ney, Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel, 1994, Sapienza, 1992).
4. A syndicate often takes the form of a limited partnership. A lead VC assumes the role of the 
general partners with other co-investing VCs acting as limited partners.
5. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) defined polyarchies as project decisions that were made in the affirma­
tive only if two reviewers agree that the project is worth pursuing.
6. This argument is similar to the one made by Williamson (1975) about economies of internal 
capital markets and the increased efficiency of risk evaluation that is available to inside inves­
tors compared with those on the outside.
7. Responses from these 30 firms were not analyzed for this research project because it examines 
VC advice that was provided after first round funding.
8. No significant differences were found between respondents and non-respondents with regard to 
the amount of funding reported by VCs [F(l, 688) = 1.53; /? = .22] nor by the stage of ftinding 
(X^ (5, N = 779) = 7.672; p = . 17).
9. This measure is similar to the Herfindahl measure of industry concentration and corporate 
diversification.
10. There were 30 no longer in business ventures, 84 living dead ventures, 24 merged or acquired 
ventures, and 58 IPO ventures in the sample.
11. Nine firms remained that could not be classified. We suspect that these firms are no longer in 
business. They were omitted from this study.
12. As expected, the Cronbach’s alpha was low (0.32) because these indicators are taping into five 
different aspects of industry attractiveness. Given that they can not be reliably scaled using a 
single composite scale, the appropriate thing to do would have been to include them in the mul­
tinomial logistic regression equation as separate aspects of industry attractiveness. Unfortu-
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nately, the statistical model lacked sufficient degrees of freedom to accommodate their separate 
inclusion. We concluded that the popularity of these indicators in the literature justifies them 
being used as a scale. This would be a more serious limitation of this study if they were depen­
dent variables instead of being used as control variables. We could have omitted them alto­
gether, but in our view there is sufficient theoretical justification for including them.
13. Numerous inquiries to those who utilized this “top” terminology failed to uncover a quantitative 
basis for their classification scheme. Although a qualitative scheme was appropriate for their 
purposes, we needed to convert it into a quantitative classification system.
14. In those cases where two VCs invested the same amount, the first VC mentioned was desig­
nated as the “top" VC.
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